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ABSTRACT

The popular revolution in Iran has been one of the most publicized yet least well understood events in world politics. This booklet was developed to contribute to the understanding of the complexities of the situation in relation to Iran's future and U.S.--Iranian relations. The booklet contains three parts that include: (1) the revolution; (2) the question of succession; and (3) U.S. policy options. The revolution had widespread support due to countrywide opposition to the royal regime. The liberal leaders of the revolution accepted the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini because of the powerful appeal of his personality. The revolution quickly polarized between the liberal reformists and the revolutionary religious elite. With the passing of Khomeini from the political scene, the dedication to achieving a consensus government based on Islamic ideology will subside. A struggle for leadership will occur, and a major effort will be made by the victors to achieve strong central control of the government and its institutions. Iran is militarily significant to the United States in containing the southward expansion of the Soviet Union. But the vicissitudes of U.S. policy toward Iran suggest that there has been no crystallization of a conclusion as to whether the Islamic Republican regime is a greater liability than an asset. A glossary of names and terms is provided. (SM)

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Khomeini, the Future, and US Options

Richard W. Cottam

Policy Paper 38

The Stanley Foundation



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About the Essay

The immense, popular revolution in Iran led by the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has been one of the most publicized yet least well understood events in world politics. Yet an understanding of the complexities of the situation is essential to speculate on Iran's future and US-Iranian relations.

Professor Richard Cottam's engaging analysis of events immediately following the overthrow of the Shah serves as a cognitive road map through the maze of political events and factional battles in the early years of the revolution.

In the second section of his paper, Professor Cottam turns to the intriguing question of succession. Who will be the new leaders after the passing of Khomeini? The scenarios for succession are as fascinating as they are complicated, and this section of the paper provides a clear examination of the possibilities, each of which has global implications.

The United States, for bad or good, has long been a major player in Iranian affairs, and Iran has unquestionably had a major impact on US policy. What are the key policy options for the United States after the transfer of power in Iran, and what questions should we now be asking ourselves in preparation for that inevitable occurrence? As Cottam points out: "There is much concern about political succession in Iran but also much uncertainty as to the implications of the different possibilities for US objectives in the region." One certainty remains: Whatever path the United States chooses will continue to profoundly affect both nations.

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Khomeini, the Future, and US Options

Richard W. Cottam

Policy Paper 38

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Part One

The Revolution

On December 11, 1978, the holy day of Ashura, as many as eight million Iranians marched in the streets of their cities, towns, and villages and shouted their support for revolutionary change in Iran. Many in the crowds were celebrating the emergence of a great religio-political leader who they were sure would guide them into a new order, one that would conform with God's plan for a just society. The revolution had been gathering strength for many months and the Ashura demonstrators believed that it had already produced over sixty thousand martyrs. The Shah, his hated, feared, and ubiquitous security force, SAVAK, and his Imperial Guard, they believed, would not hesitate to take many more. Rumors were widespread that helicopter battle ships would strafe the celebrants. Yet out they poured, many marching in disciplined, obviously well-organized companies. Others carried small children even though the number of child martyrs was high and cards with pathetic pictures of their broken bodies circulated widely. This scene is important to keep in mind. The Iranian revolution was probably the greatest popular revolution in human history and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini quite possibly the charismatic leader with the broadest appeal among his people.

Yet there is a sense among students of Iran that this great movement not only has not inaugurated a historical force that could sweep all of Islam and possibly much of the Third World (the world of the oppressed as Khomeini describes it) but also that it may not long survive the passing of its leader. This feeling exists in spite of evidence that the appeal of the movement in Iran is mirrored in important respects throughout the Islamic world and, indeed, is deepening. No mistake could be greater than trivializing this important socio-political phenomenon. It has succeeded where the secular Left has been unable to capture the imagination and support of a newly awakened urban mass public. It has attracted an intensity of support among its true-believing core that is simply unsurpassed in human history, but there are fundamental reasons for questioning whether it is, as it sees itself, a profoundly important and long-lived historical force. The question of what Iran will look like after Khomeini really asks for a judgment regarding the strength of a universal Islamic political movement.

The Process of Polarization

From the beginning the Islamic nature of the Iranian revolution had an illusory quality. The millions of marchers on Ashura were organized by religious leaders and their bureaucratic staffs, but millions of others, whether part of the unorganized participants in the marches or remaining at home, were also part of the Iranian revolution. They recognized Khomeini as the most important of revolu-

tionary leaders, although many of them failed to understand the extraordinary dimension of his charismatic appeal. Their involvement, however, had nothing to do with an image of a new order in conformity with God's plan. They were opposed to the royal regime for a variety of reasons, and their dreams of a future Iran varied widely as well. For a great many of them, Iranian nationalism was at the base of their anger at the Shah and of their aspirations for the future. The Iran of their aspirations would have the dignity denied the Shah's Iran, because it would be in control of its own destiny and would not be an instrument of US policy. It would be a secular state, and although culturally sharply distinctive, philosophically much in tune with the liberal or socialist West. In retrospect there was from the beginning a sharp polarization between the secular and religious communities.

This retrospective view, too, is in important respects illusory. The leadership of the revolution was disparate but not polarized. Those furnishing strategic directions tended to be liberal, some secular, and others religious. Authoritarian leaders, Left and religious, had the support of much of the most talented and activist youth. They did not sit at the center of the revolutionary command, but they furnished many of the most effective fighters for revolutionary change and willingly coordinated their activities with those of the established leaders. However, the liberal leaders in particular did have an understanding that the charismatic appeal of Khomeini was so powerful that he alone could overbalance the entire leadership structure. His populist appeal was so extensive that he could, should he wish to do so, give definition to the organization and the character of the revolutionary regime. Was it within the realm of possibility that the regime could be a liberal one with mutual tolerance of the secularist and religious elements? Liberal leaders hoped so, and some of them were determined to make every effort to produce such an outcome. There were some hopeful signs. First, there was a broad consensus among the leaders in support of tolerance, and Khomeini appeared to place a high value on a perpetuation of a unity of purpose among the leadership. Second, Khomeini's own image of the Islamic society was highly abstract and not at all easily translated into institutional and programmatic terms. Mehdi Bazargan, Khomeini's choice for the first prime minister of the soon-to-be formed Islamic republic, had the requisite experience, understanding of Islam, and trust of other leaders to give a liberal translation to Khomeini's abstract image. Were Khomeini to see his role as one of giving moral guidance and serving as a legitimizing agent for the regime from his residence in Qom, ninety miles from Tehran, the hope just might materialize.

Reformists versus Revolutionaries

It was not to be. A predominant rhythm quickly developed; the flow of which moved inexorably in the direction of sharp polarization. Largely from outside the established religio-political leadership, a fervently revolutionary religious elite appeared. The change Bazargan and the liberals favored was essentially one of restoring the rule of law to Iran and very little one of producing a sharp alteration in the composition of the governing elite and the norms on which governmental organization would be based. In identity terms they were deeply attached to an Iranian national community; the core element of which was at once Persian- or Turkish-speaking and Shia Moslem in religion. The change the revolutionaries favored had nothing to do with the rule of a law which they saw as secular but involved a purging of the old elite and the norms of governmental organization on which it was based. In identity terms they claimed the broad Islamic community, the *ummah*, as the community of primary attachment. A major question is whether in their denial of the Iranian national community the religious radicals, the revolutionaries, were simply giving expression to Khomeini's own preferences. Were they concealing to themselves their own attachment to the Iranian nation as well as a much stronger attachment to the Shia community than to the broad Islamic community.

The immediate focus of conflict between the reformists (the secular and religious liberals) and the revolutionaries was the institutional base for the new regime. The old governmental institutions had been retained and the reformists were given control of them. But the collapse of the *ancien regime* had been so total that some time would be required to resuscitate these institutions. In the meantime, order had to be preserved and the danger of counter revolution allayed. To serve this purpose, a set of revolutionary institutions was created which was manned by increasingly revolutionary religious leaders. If the liberal dream was to be realized, Bazargan's government had to gain control of the revolutionary institutions before they gave birth to a new governmental elite with a sufficient base of support to seize power.

Bazargan's failure was a consequence of many factors.[1] First, the support base for the reformist leadership was potentially large and powerful. It would incorporate much of the middle and upper-middle classes, an element of the population fairly easily mobilized because of its urban base and one critically important for the technological functioning of society. But there were important obstacles standing in the path of realizing that potential. The middle classes, which had been the base of support for Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq in the early 1950s, had come, albeit without any real enthusiasm, to

accommodate the regime of the Shah. They did so in part because of a conviction that the Shah's power was unchallengeable and in part because of a very real achievement of material aspirations. Therefore, they did not join the revolution until the Shah's vulnerability was no longer deniable, and they did so without organization or leadership. Furthermore, this element was surprised and bemused by the appearance of political fervor on the part of the urban poor in support of the revolutionaries. They found it difficult to understand the dramatic change in the percentage of the Iranian population now predisposed to participate in politics and tended to underestimate the new political importance of the religious leaders' support base. When the revolutionary regime pursued what they considered to be reprehensible policies, such as the early executions of *ancien regime* functionaries, they blamed Bazargan's weakness in permitting such behavior. There is little to indicate that more than a few of them understood that success or failure for Bazargan rested on his ability to attract a base of support that would grant him a strong political bargaining position and that they had to be that base of support. Finally, a paralyzing mythology began to be embraced by much of the secular element: Khomeini's rise to power was a consequence of Anglo-American machinations. The exaggeration of Western capability on which this conclusion rested was a consequence of earlier Western interferences such as ousting Musaddiq and helping the Shah establish totalitarian control. But those holding this belief fell into the trap of also believing that only the West, given its overwhelming power, could remedy the situation. They felt Iranians were not, and had had been for a long time, able to control their own destiny. The focus of their efforts to replace the Khomeini regime came to be and remains enlisting external, primarily US, help in doing so.

Second, the authoritarian Left—the Mujahaddin, representing the religious element, and a large section (though called the "minority") of the Fedayan, representing the secular—was an early de facto ally of the radical religious leaders in the unequal struggle for control of the revolution. These people at least understood, as much as the secular liberals had not, that the Iranian revolution was a reflection of the politicization of the Iranian mass public. Their short-term objective, therefore, was to make clear their support for revolutionary change as opposed to simple reform. They directed their long-term planning toward the objective of wresting control of the newly, politically active mass from a religious leadership which they felt could not provide the kind of new economic order that could bring social justice to the mass of the people. However, they divided sharply on the proper strategy to follow. The authoritarian Left moved toward and then into direct and violent confrontation

with the regime following Bazargan's defeat. The "majority" Fedayan joined with the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party in an ingratiation strategy operating on the assumption that they could pick up the pieces when the regime failed to satisfy the material aspirations of the mass. Both strategies failed, and the Left suffered a defeat so severe as to lose any real credibility in the short term as an alternative to the regime.[2] After the defeat of the liberals and the Left, the central socio-political characteristic of Iran was one of extreme polarization. There was a core support group of indeterminate size but of extraordinary fervor that granted the revolutionary regime the ability to remain in power and to survive in the face of terrible external and internal challenges. But there was, as well, another group of indeterminate but substantial size (which included the royalists and soon would include the secular liberals) that was irreconcilable to the point of denying the government any real prospect of achieving general consensus and hence broad legitimacy. This group stands as the primary source of vulnerability for the regime. In addition it poses a major challenge to the forces of political Islam. Can an Islamic ideology be presented in such a way as to appeal to the broad populace or must a significant section of the public, as in Iran, be terrorized into acquiescing in it?

Core Support of the Revolutionary Regime

Iran is a closed society in important respects. However, those who embrace the regime enthusiastically enjoy a good deal of freedom. It is possible, therefore, to identify the locus of the core support group. It is drawn primarily from the urban lower and lower-middle classes. Recruitment for the Revolutionary Guard and other revolutionary security forces is drawn largely from these groups. The huge crowds that turn out for Friday prayer and in response to governmental appeals for political demonstrations reflect the easy mobilization of the core support group. The high morale of soldiers at the front, especially given the lack of air cover in desert battlefields, gives undeniable evidence of the fervor of support the regime is granted. Furthermore, the low sense of efficacy and high degree of defeatism of those opposed to the regime reflect the intimidating quality of such fervent supporters.

How broad is this base of support? Most estimates, from government supporters and detractors alike, are self-serving and, hence, must be treated with skepticism. However, there is one major source of evidence which should be viewed very seriously by anyone interested in exploring this question: parliamentary elections. These elections are far from free since major candidates who would appeal to disaffected sections of the population are denied the right to run for office. But among those permitted to run, there is a substan-

tial range of choice. Furthermore, there is little evidence of major rigging or of forced voting. The April-May 1984 voter turnout in the parliamentary elections was 65 percent as compared with 43 percent in the previous election.[3] Electoral participation, therefore, is not unimpressive.

Most surprising is the absence of voting patterns which would give some indication of how those voters who dislike the regime are attempting to register their disaffection. In the first presidential election, for example, the assumption was that the vote for Ahmad Madani who registered second in the results with 2 million votes (compared with 10.7 million for Abol Hassan Bani Sadr) had been the beneficiary of support from the disaffected. Why are some candidates not making an appeal to the disaffected even at a fairly subtle level? The question may be highly suggestive regarding public attitudes in Iran in this period. In all probability the opposition core simply could not be persuaded to vote for anyone willing to participate in the political life of this despised regime. Their opposition is absolute and nothing short of a removal of the regime has any real appeal. Between the two poles there seems to be a large group of individuals, in fact probably a majority, that is acquiescing in the regime and willing to participate in elections on occasion and within the permitted boundaries. It is this large acquiescing mass that holds the key to regime longevity. Should the regime begin to appear vulnerable, as that of the Shah's did, would those acquiescing begin to join the opposition, remain true to the regime, or maintain a passive stance?

The Intransigent Opposition

The intransigent opposition pole is led and directed from abroad. In fact, the absolute quality of its opposition is best reflected in its willingness to solicit the support of external governments, including and especially Iraq, as the focus of its tactical plan. The ironies are exquisite. Many of the opposition leaders operating from the United States and western Europe had been leaders of the revolution and had described the Shah as "America's Shah." Now they find difficulty thinking seriously of a plan to overturn this regime which would not include US clandestine participation. They had tended to see Israel as the foremost regional agent of US policy and it was Shapur Bakhtiar, now a major opposition leader, who as the Shah's last prime minister broke relations with Israel. Now Israel is among the most solicited of external powers by a full range of exile leaders, both those who had supported the Shah's alliance with Israel and those who had opposed it. Leaders such as Bakhtiar had seen King Hossein of Jordan, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and other so-called "moderate" Arabs as following a path of treason much like

that of the Shah of Iran. Now Dr. Bakhtiar sees King Hossein and Anwar Sadat as the Arab leaders most to be admired.[4] Most revealing of all is the willing cooperation with Saddam Hossein's Iraq. Not only had Iraq attacked Iran in September 1980, it had done so in the name of the Arab nation opposing Iranian nationalist ambitions not the forces of Islam. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that Saddam Hossein meant to restore the Iranian province of Khuzistan, which the Arabs call Arabistan, with its oil and refineries to the Arab nation.[5] All of this notwithstanding, the opposition, and most notably the Mujahaddin, have more or less openly looked to Iraq as an ally against the Iranian government.

Cooperation of Iranian Kurds with Iraq lacks the same quality of irony. The long and tragic struggle of the Kurds for their own national dignity has led to a willingness to make alliances on the basis of pragmatic judgments. Their joining the opposition pole, therefore, is simply a product of a judgment that therein lies the best hope for extensive autonomy or independence. Iraqi Kurds, in tune with this same imperative, have allied with Iran.

As its apparent nonparticipation in elections indicates, the intransigent opposition has not thought strategically in terms of attempting to take advantage of factional splits within the government. It has thought, instead, almost exclusively in terms of all-out warfare against the government. As such, to solicit allies even from among former enemies is simply to follow time-honored practices of warfare. But how seriously is the intransigent opposition thinking of engaging in warfare against the regime inside Iran? The voting behavior previously mentioned, indicating that much of the population inside Iran is acquiescing in the regime, may provide an answer to that question. A similar acquiescence occurred for a generation under the Shah. It indicated then, and probably indicates now, a sense of regime invulnerability and, conversely, a lack of a sense of efficacy on the part of those who dislike the regime. No tactical objective is more obviously central for oppositionists than that of convincing the disenchanted mass that the regime is vulnerable and can be overturned. Presumably this point is well-understood by exile leaders. However, only the Mujahaddin is following through with tactics designed to produce such an effect. The others apparently are waiting for the day when the external support that they see as essential materializes to effect change inside Iran.

The Liberal Opposition Inside Iran

There is one major exception to this opposition pattern, however. The liberals, secular and religious, who suffered such a devastating

defeat at the hands of the radical religious leaders and who remain in Iran often hang on at the margins of the regime. They are dismissed by the intransigent opposition as pathetic agents of the regime whose capacity for humiliation knows no bounds. However, regardless of this harsh judgment, they are in fact publishing criticisms of the regime that are particularly severe in that they challenge the very basis of the regime's claim for legitimacy: its interpretation of Islamic ideology and its dedication to the pursuit of the war with Iraq. Mehdi Bazargan attempted to run for the presidency on a platform which called for a return to the early promise of the revolution as an exemplar of the rule of law and of tolerance and which called for termination of the war with Iraq. He was not permitted to do so, but in the process of making the attempt, he gave voice to arguments that appear to have a strong resonance in Iran.[6] The remnants of Bazargan's Freedom Front, of the secular National Front, and smaller organizations such as the Radical Movement have formed a united front that is attempting nothing less than a reversal of the extreme polarization in Iran. Since many of the regime's leaders worked with the Freedom Front and the National Front to overturn the Shah's regime, there is both sympathy and respect for Bazargan and his colleagues, albeit muted, among some officials at the highest levels of the government including quite possibly from Khomeini personally. Furthermore, there clearly were and are many Iranian leaders both within the government and among exiles who viewed the polarization of society as calamitous. The death of Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Beheshti in a bombing attack on the regime leadership in 1981 may have prevented a really serious move from within the regime toward reconciliation with the liberal element.[7] Certainly, the early death of Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani removed one of the major figures who might have worked for an even broader reconciliation. Exile leaders, such as Abol Hassan Bani Sadr and Ahmad Madani are favorably inclined toward following a strategy of reducing rather than rigidifying the polarization that has developed.

Khomeini as Political Leader

The revolutionary regime in Iran is truly anomalous. It is an example of authoritarian populism and has the general features of other regimes which maintain their authority in part by the populist appeal of a magnetic leader—one with an exceptional ability to excite by symbol manipulation—and in part by coercing those who are not receptive to the leader's appeal. But the charismatic leader is such a critical factor in regime survival that his style of governing gives general definition to the regime. So it is with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides for an institution that reflects well Khomeini's thinking re-

garding the role of religious leaders in the governance of an Islamic state. That institution, the *vilayet e faqih*, or guardianship of the religious jurist, serves as the constitutional base for Khomeini's leadership in Iran. Khomeini is the *faqih*, the jurist or guide. Viewed literally, the constitution seems to allow the occupant or occupants of this position possibly the greatest scope of action of any institutional position in constitutional history. He or they have the right to appoint or remove virtually any governmental official and ultimately have an absolute veto over governmental policy. But Khomeini saw the occupant of the position as one (or several, it can be a collective) who has a profound understanding of the divine plan for a just society and ascertains that governmental policy follows a direction that is in accord with that plan. Certainly the guide is not, as Khomeini views the position, a dictator even though he can when the occasion warrants dictate compliance with the divine plan.[8] In practice, Khomeini has been, by and large, true to his vision of the institution of *vilayet e faqih*. The primary anomaly of Khomeini's rule, in fact, is that he does not exercise personal dictatorial control nor has he allowed anyone under him to do so. Yet the Iranian system is functionally authoritarian and the opposition is controlled by brutal coercion.

Khomeini: Devil or Other Worldly Guide?

This view of Khomeini is not held by most of those in the opposition pole. They see Khomeini in classic devil form—an evil genius able to think through and orchestrate conspiracies with casts of hundreds which occur over months and even years. In this image Khomeini planned the rise and fall of Bazargan and Bani Sadr and with them all remnants of liberalism and secularism. He planned the hostage crisis to firm his own power base (many believe in collusion with Carter who had his own popularity problems) and prolongs the war to feed his insatiable ambition. He cynically accepted CIA sponsorship to come into power while condemning the Shah for being a US puppet and, as the US overture, later called the arms for hostages deal or Irangate, demonstrated, continues to have a clandestine working relationship with the Americans and with the Israelis he pretends to despise. The task for the opposition, they believe, is to convince the Americans that their support for Khomeini is a mistake and contrary to the US anticommunist purpose. This reality view is the source of opposition paralysis and the devil image of Khomeini is a central aspect of that view.

It is the view in this essay that Khomeini is an abstract thinker of considerable power who has so little concern for this worldly matters as to be functionally inattentive. His task is that of bringing Islamic ideology to bear on governance. Yet so absorbed is he in the

abstract base of the ideology that he is largely unconcerned with programmatic translation. Indeed, as he sees it, his role as guide is one of identifying which governmental programs are in conformity with the divine plan and which are not. Certainly it is not his role to construct the programs; that is the task of the politician and the technocrat. However, given his powerful intellect, his deep interest in philosophical abstractions, and a position of leadership which should have compelled him to make many difficult policy choices, there should have emerged some sense of general political philosophical direction to the government Khomeini led. But in important areas of domestic policy this has not occurred, for example, regarding the governmental role in the economy. Deep disagreement exists within the regime on such questions, but Khomeini has remained above them.

Khomeini's Policy Impact on Iran

However, in several areas of major policy concern Khomeini has given his regime a strong sense of direction. But even in these areas his position seems to have evolved gradually over time rather than to be a reflection of a strongly held and well-articulated political philosophy. Regarding the central political conflict of the early months of the revolutionary regime, the battle for control over the revolutionary institutions set up to provide order immediately after the collapse of the Shah, Khomeini vacillated a great deal. On occasion he seemed to support Bazargan's desperate efforts to gain control, but over time a pattern emerged of perpetuating the revolutionary institutions. Similarly, in those early days Khomeini made a great many statements at Bazargan's urging that called for maintenance of revolutionary unity but did little beyond this to halt or even to slow down the drift toward polarization. Those who see Khomeini in classic devil form believe this was part of a carefully worked out and devious plan. It is difficult to understand, however, why Bazargan, with his pathetically inadequate support base, was deserving of such devilish attention. Yet the polarizing process was a consequence of Khomeini's decisions and, hence, reflects very well his contempt for secularists whom he saw as having betrayed their own culture and turned to the ungodly West. Tolerance, for Khomeini, is restricted for those who have truly submitted to God's will as Khomeini interprets that will.

Khomeini is similarly responsible for another defining characteristic of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A constant theme for Khomeini has been that of unity among the faithful (those who accept Khomeini's interpretation of God's will). His preference is clearly for general policy consensus, and he is manifestly uncomfortable when strong disagreements emerge among individuals whom he

sees as fully dedicated to the Islamic ideology. He has opposed factionalism and has frequently been willing to give support to those who appear to be fighting a losing battle. The end result has been an inability of any one faction or any single individual to achieve a clear victory in the internal power struggle. Here again, those who view Khomeini in devil-theory terms see this as an aspect of Khomeini's own cleverness—an application of the divide and conquer technique. Regardless of intention, however, Khomeini's policy has produced a defining feature of his regime: In spite of deep policy differences and strong personal power rivalries, no leader has emerged to seize control of governmental affairs. When Khomeini failed to provide the kind of specific leadership expected from him as *faqih*, others assumed greater decisional responsibilities than the constitution would appear to have intended. Naturally enough, power gravitated to individuals who wished it and had the talent and drive to seek it. The result was particularly anomalous in regard to the power that accrued to the speaker of parliament, an individual who occupied an institutional position that seemed to offer a most unlikely power base. Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is possibly the most dynamic political leader in Iran, and his ambitions were not to be denied. Below Khomeini, the office of speaker of parliament became second only to that of the president as a locus of power. The occupants of these two positions became the primary competitors for power. However, the boundaries of permitted maneuvering for power were narrow and neither Rafsanjani nor the president, Hojatolislam Ali Hossein Khamenei, could afford to be overly blatant in its exercise.

A major consequence of the inability of any individual to achieve dictatorial control is the persistent decentralization that appeared with the creation of revolutionary institutions. After the defeat of Bazargan and then of Bani Sadr, the struggle to establish strong, central control over institutions persisted under the leadership of the religio-political leaders who became politically dominant after Bani Sadr's defeat. But progress in this direction has been very slow particularly with regard to the institutions that provided the basis for coercive control, especially the Komitehs and the Revolutionary Guard. Decentralization persisted at a level that allowed for a phenomenon resembling warlordism. Ambitious and assertive individuals, often with their own guard contingent, could engage in virtually autonomous policy behavior. The entourage of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the projected successor of Khomeini, for example, acted with independence even in areas involving critical foreign policy questions.

In the area of foreign policy, Khomeini is inattentive with regard to detail but, possibly more than in any other decisional area, has provided a strong general sense of direction. Here, just as in the realm of Islamic ideology, Khomeini operates at a high level of abstraction. He sees a world divided between the "oppressors" and the "oppressed," a view that is close conceptually to the distinction made in US writings of North and South. The primary oppressor powers today are the United States and the Soviet Union, but they operate with and through oppressor world allies, mainly the states of Western Europe, and through two usurper entities, Israel and South Africa. In addition, they control a number of regimes in the oppressed world, including some in the Islamic world, which Khomeini regards as agent regimes or "lackeys."

The two primary oppressors are rivals in important respects, but Khomeini believes they will unite against a challenge from the oppressed world if such a challenge seems to threaten the basis of their hegemonic control. Their ability to maintain this hegemony, he believes, rests in large degree on a grossly exaggerated view of their capability, a view that is shared, unfortunately, by the oppressed peoples. It is Khomeini's task to demonstrate to the oppressed and the oppressors alike that the former have the ability to cast off the control of the latter. To do so requires the will and the courage that come from an awareness that the liberation of the oppressed peoples is a task with divine sanction. Khomeini's concern with the specifics of international relations, like that for the specifics of domestic economic policy, is slight to nonexistent. But there is no sign in his behavior of any wavering on the basic task. Iranian policy may, therefore, be inconsistent in particulars, but at the level of Khomeini's concern, there is solid determination.

Khomeini's refusal to accept generous terms for a settlement of the Iran-Iraq War is a good example of his influence in the foreign policy area. In his view the attack on Iran by Iraq was, in fact, the action of an oppressor surrogate regime acting on the orders of its mentors to eliminate the one truly great challenge emanating from the oppressed world, the Islamic revolution in Iran. Soviet-US cooperation, although rhetorically disguised, is a central aspect of the response. Fully in accord with expectations, the agent regimes of the area, especially Jordan and Egypt but including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have been enlisted by the oppressor mentors along with the British and the French and of course Israel (referred to as the Zionist entity) to beat back the challenge. Also in accord with expectations, the superior moral strength of the Islamic revolution with divine assistance is more than a match for this unprecedented array of opponents. Meeting with defeat, the oppressors are attempting to

force a peace settlement on Iran which will allow them time to recover and to devise new strategies for opposing the challenge. Irangate was a manifestation of the search for a new strategy. But no one should be deceived by appearances: eliminating the oppressed-world challenge is the primary oppressor objective.

Part Two

The Question of Succession

It is within the milieu so uniquely defined by Ayatollah Khomeini, and described in Part One, that the question of succession must be considered. The problems facing the would-be successors within the regime are fairly easily laid out. There is first and foremost the absence of anyone on the horizon with an appeal to the core support groups comparable to that of Khomeini's. It is Khomeini's extraordinary ability to give expression to the anguish, the dreams, and the aspirations of this group that has provided a primary basis of authority for the regime. It is most doubtful that anyone else could by going on television bring into the streets hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic supporters. Faith in Khomeini's sincerity, devotion, and courage has been so pervasive within the core group that he could be certain that he would be supported in whatever policy he might follow regardless of the sacrifices called for. Among other governmental leaders, none has a popular base of support that is not derived from Khomeini. It is highly problematic that any successor could ask for a willingness to sacrifice on a scale even approaching that available to Khomeini.

What alternative form of control could be offered to maintain regime authority? A substantial improvement in material conditions almost certainly would be necessary to produce comparable positive support for a successor government. But in the short term, such an improvement could not be achieved. This leaves really only one short-term alternative: a sharp increase in the use of coercion. However, as has been mentioned, the coercive forces are not under a firm central direction. Furthermore, within the Revolutionary Guard leadership a considerable number of men appear to have a fair degree of autonomy.[9] Since the competing factions will surely maneuver to achieve a winning alliance among these leaders, they are in a superb bargaining position. The same point, but to a much lesser degree, would hold true of the armed forces. Beyond that, even were the outcome of a factional struggle at the central government level fairly certain, a good deal of time would be required by the leadership to establish firm lines of authority.

A second major problem is posed by the formlessness of factions within the government. Coalitions have developed around major policy questions, particularly those concerned with the governmental role in the economy. The operating logic for most observable factions, however, appears to be dictated by the struggle for personal power. Having been denied by Khomeini's style the ability to resolve factional conflict, the policy base of factional composition appears to have declined. Leading candidates for top leadership, such as Hashemi Rafasanjani, will have constructed a web of individual supporters in critical positions in many of the institutions of

government and in important outside interest groups. This support group provides the candidate with his primary bargaining base. Alliances among candidates are made and dissolved in accordance with the exigencies of the moment. Furthermore, the support group itself cannot be assumed to be a permanent entity. The visible decline in the fortunes of a leading candidate would almost certainly lead to a series of defections among supporters. Keeping score would be difficult for participants and virtually impossible for outside observers.

A third major problem, and one adding to the general uncertainty, is the failure of the regime to construct a well-ordered institutional base of support. The dissolution in 1987 of the Islamic Republic Party, which had been the dominant party supporting the regime, was a central manifestation of the problem. The role played by single parties in authoritarian systems, especially those with a strong populist base, is central for control purposes. It serves as a vehicle for regime careerism and for educating the public regarding the operating ideology and major programs. Ambitious young people need to be offered channels through which they can compete for leadership, and the party is ideally suited to provide such channels. The party is also a natural institution for organizing public support and providing indoctrination. It should, in short, serve the function of recruiting, training, and indoctrinating a new elite. Lacking strong central direction and leadership, recruiting and indoctrinating institutions have developed in the same decentralized, almost autonomous, mold as previously described. The Ministry of Islamic Guidance, for example, very much reflects the thinking and ambitions of the particular individuals who direct it and is not the kind of pivotal institution needed for indoctrination purposes.

A fourth problem, an adjunct to the above, is the problem of recruiting and training a loyal and dedicated technocratic elite. The attraction of secularism to well-trained technicians is a natural one. The difficulty of translating the Islamic ideology for developing broad economic programs has been noted. Its relevance for dealing with the technically complicated problems of modern society and industry is even more problematic. Interference by religious leaders in such affairs is hardly likely to be welcomed by those with the competence to understand and deal with such problems. The most that can be expected is an acceptance of the moral basis of the just society and an outline of general policy lines for moving toward the creation of such a society as spelled out by those who have the understanding to interpret Islamic ideology. Thus far the primary effort being made to train and recruit a loyal technocratic elite has been to monitor the religious devotion of college students and to

ascertain that those involved in the educational system have an understanding and acceptance of the Islamic ideology. How successful these efforts have been is impossible to evaluate from the outside.

What can be evaluated is the range of interpretations of what the general policy lines for achieving the just society should be. Sufficient freedom exists in Iran among supporters of the regime for a very broad range of interpretation. It is apparent that a significant number of technocratically competent young people have been mobilized to improve the quality of life of deprived elements of the population. The Reconstruction Crusade, a conglomerate institution with significant achievements to its credit, is manned by precisely the kind of dedicated and often competent people that the regime must attract. However, the judgment of Iranians visiting the United States, most of whom are strongly opposed to the regime, that the more traditional governmental institutions are manned by a more acquiescent than supportive bureaucracy should be taken seriously.

There is strong behavioral evidence that within the military a particularly talented and innovative elite is appearing. Whereas the tactical preference for "human wave" assaults may well have reflected the influence of a lay religious leadership in military affairs, more recent Iranian military behavior suggests a developing sophistication to adapt preferred tactics to Iranian capability advantages. The "human wave" assaults were of course vital evidence of the commitment of the core support group to the regime, but they were no more defensible on pragmatic grounds than on moral grounds. Iranian military successes in 1986 and 1987 and an associated developing confidence continue to be a consequence of the unprecedented willingness of hundreds of thousands of young men to risk the ultimate sacrifice. But successful adaptations of equipment, tactics, and strategy are equally clear evidence of the existence of a new and unique professionalism.

Something of the same can be said regarding those responsible for information and analysis relating to foreign policy and strategy. Commentaries on Radio Tehran and in the press are frequently rich, well-informed, and compelling analytically. Iraqi counterparts, in contrast, produce sterile renditions of a well-established party line. Iranian foreign policy offers a far more mixed picture. That policy, however, is often contradictory and fails to follow a single strategic line. This may reflect a preoccupation with the war with Iraq and the exceptional difficulty of recruiting foreign service personnel with the requisite area expertise.[10]

In sum, the success in recruiting a new technocratic elite is mixed

and remains a critical problem for those interested in orderly succession.

Some Strategic Alternatives

With the passing of Khomeini from the political scene, there surely will pass as well the strange dedication to achieving a consensus among those who believe that an Islamic ideology should prevail. Almost certainly a struggle for leadership will be resolved, and a major effort will be made by the victors to achieve strong central control of the government and its institutions. Also easily predictable is the immediate cast of characters who will make the effort to achieve primacy in a new governing structure. However, the range of strategies and tactics used in this struggle is predictable only in its breadth. The logic for the particular strategies that are catalogued below is to be found in the preceding analysis of the situation in Iran at the time of writing.

Revolutionary Ideological

The possibility that post-Khomeini Iran will be more rather than less revolutionary is strangely underestimated. Any prognosis of probabilities for change in this direction must rest on an estimate of the size, location, and leadership of an ideologically committed technocratic elite of the variety mentioned above in connection with the Reconstruction Crusade and the Revolutionary Guard. Journalistic accounts of Iran tend to grant leadership of a radical revolutionary faction to Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, Khomeini's projected successor as *faqih*. Montazeri indeed is a revolutionary much in the Khomeini mold although without the same magic appeal. His reality view is identical with that of Khomeini, and his aspirations for the oppressed world and for bringing the just society to Islam and ultimately all mankind are like Khomeini's. But also like Khomeini and unlike Rafsanjani, he does not have a sense of organization and of the need to develop his bargaining position to an optimal level in pursuit of power. He diverges from Khomeini in terms of his tolerance for diversity, even including individuals who have deep criticism of the regime. In a real sense he is the protector of Mehdi Bazargan and the liberal opposition. Montazeri could be in important regards an ally of the revolutionary ideologues. The organization that has embraced him, familial at base, tended toward that position and received his support at critical moments, but ultimately he would likely have difficulty with its absolutism.

The type of individual likely to give direction to, if not lead, such a faction would be Hojatolislam Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha, currently state prosecutor, and Behzad Nabavi, Minister of Heavy In-

dustry. The major political figure closest to them would be Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. The Iran they would like to see would be one that continued to pursue a revolutionary foreign policy and a domestic policy of societal reform and concern for the deprived. *Tactically, they would surely attempt quickly to bring into* alliance with them major elements of the Revolutionary Guards. A totalitarian control structure with purges of conservative elements would likely be early goals. Planning in military, foreign affairs, and societal change would be centralized. The objective in the foreign policy area would be the same as that of Khomeini, liberation of the oppressed world and a unity at least of purpose of the broad Islamic *ummah*. But strategic planning for that end would be more systematic. Fears of sympathy for the Soviet Union among these people are probably misplaced.

Dictatorship Based on the Core Support Group

This second category would be composed of leaders who are fully devoted to the Islamic regime in Iran but who lack the deep social commitment and the revolutionary fervor of the previous category. They count among their close supporters individuals with fairly conservative positions in economic and social matters and those with little sympathy for the socialist proclivities, as they would see them, of the revolutionary ideological group. They argue for, and no doubt sincerely, the primacy of the *ummah* but believe Iran should advance the Islamic cause by example, not by a policy of ideological messianism. They are, in other words, politicians prepared to institutionalize a favorable status quo.

The Iran desired by individuals in this category would be one that implicitly accepted as permanent the secular-religious polarization of society. The Iranian exiles could follow the pattern of the White Russians, a previous example of polarization, with the second generation being absorbed into the host country of their exile. The secular pole within Iran could be expected to follow the same rhythm, with the new generation accommodating to and then being absorbed into the new order. Control for some time would of necessity have to be based on much intensified coercion. Since this would grant a central role to the leaders of security forces, there would be, in effect, a religio-military dictatorship with a much enhanced possibility of future military coups.

This model would differ from the previous one rather substantially. Both would move rapidly toward institutional centralization, but this one would look to a more conventional bureaucratic structure. The symbols of the revolution would remain in full force, but shifts away from militance should occur. Over time a subtle shift in

focus toward the Shiah community and the Iranian nation could be expected, although this would be more in response to a sense of the strong identity attachments of the Iranian people than to their own preferences. They fairly early should be receptive to a generous offer for settlement of the Iran-Iraq War. Satisfying the material demands of *bazaaris* and other mercantile elements and of white collar workers should take precedence over a more radical concern with improving the quality of life of the deprived. In sum, the process should be one of making the revolution routine.

This model should appeal to leaders such as President Ali Hossein Khamenei and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini who clearly have strong ambitions to lead the Islamic Republic of Iran and could be expected to modify their own positions in order to consolidate support. They could be expected to continue to make symbolically loaded appeals to the core support group and would make every effort to give the appearance of being totally true to Khomeini, but they would need as well to move as quickly as possible toward improving the Iranian economy if the utilitarian interests of the support group and the accommodating and acquiescing communities were to be satisfied. Iran would remain rhetorically militant regarding the Third World and nonaligned in the cold war. But a shift toward foreign policy pragmatism would best serve their domestic utilitarian interests.

Broadly-Based Dictatorship

At the time of writing of this essay, Speaker of the Parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani has the highest probability for success as the candidate for primary political leadership in a post-Khomeini Iran. Commonly referred to as a "pragmatist," Hashemi Rafsanjani is surely the most talented of proregime politicians. A survey of his statements on any particular issue of significance, for example, the war with Iraq, is certain to produce an array of contradictions. Therefore, a wide range in judgments of his actual position can be defended. On occasion he presents a reality view that is not in accord with that of Khomeini, but he may quickly alter that view to bring it into full conformity with that of the *Imam*, often with enhanced militance. Yet with all this disparity in positioning, he appears to be strengthening his claim for primary leadership. He was clearly identified by Americans involved in the Irangate maneuver as the "moderate" leader with whom they sought to work. In doing so, the Americans placed Rafsanjani in the vulnerable position of not only having collaborated with the "great satan" but also of having been in at least de facto collaboration with the hated "usurper" state, Israel. Yet he was able to parlay this vulnerability into in-

creased strength by presenting a convincing case of having outwitted both the United States and Israel.

Hashemi Rafsanjani is clearly a man who understands the need for an organization. His exceptional talents in this regard are, in fact, most apparent in his having been able to use the institutional base of speaker of parliament to build an organization of impressive dimension. He is commonly accepted as the politician with the greatest influence among the top leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, but his organizational net goes far beyond the security forces and has penetrated most governmental institutions. How he is able to maintain credibility for promises of major payoffs for his clientele is not at all clear. Surely there must be many overlapping expectations for reward, but his success in preserving his net is not to be denied.

A later section of this essay will deal with the most probable scenario in a succession struggle. Given the above judgment that Hashemi Rafsanjani is at the moment the individual most likely to emerge with dictatorial power in Iran, that scenario will describe some of the major problems Hashemi Rafsanjani will face and a range of possible outcomes. In this section the objective is to attempt to understand Hashemi Rafsanjani's general political strategic objectives. What is the Iran of the future that Hashemi Rafsanjani wishes to see? A central strategic concern attributed to him is that of reducing polarization. The strategy called for could be called one of "liberalization," a strategy that leaders of authoritarian regimes often turn to in order to broaden the base of support for the regime. But the Hashemi Rafsanjani depicted here should not be thought of as a "liberal." His interest in reducing polarization is not a reflection of personal tolerance. The future Iran that Hashemi Rafsanjani wishes to see is one ruled by him. The choice of a liberalization strategy is, in other words, an instrumental choice—not one reflecting value commitment. Evidence for this conclusion can be seen in Hashemi Rafsanjani's dealings with the regime's liberal opponents and his attitude toward the limited freedom of expression that exists in Iran.[11] In sharp contrast to the highly ideological Ayatollah Montezari whose vision of an Islamic society includes tolerance and compassion and who is a primary advocate of expanding the boundaries of freedom of expression, the pragmatic, "moderate" Hashemi Rafsanjani has taken the lead in opposing liberals. He has shown no interest in broadening the scope of freedom of expression.

Hashemi Rafsanjani's preferred strategy for attracting a broader public support for the regime is almost exclusively utilitarian. He

would like to persuade technically competent exiles to return to Iran where they would be assured of a life style not dissimilar to the one they enjoyed under the Shah: a good salary, social prestige, and an orderly, predictable political system. The middle class would slowly be restored to the position of primary beneficiary of the regime's economic and social policies. In all probability the war with Iraq would be ended as soon as a formula fulfilling Khomeini's objectives could be constructed to present to the core support group. Iran's foreign policy and domestic objectives would continue to be presented in the familiar symbolic terms of the Khomeini era but the reality would be one of restoring good relations with old foes, ending Iran's diplomatic isolation, and focusing on economic questions of trade and industrial reconstruction. Any US expectations that Iran would once again become a US regional surrogate, however, would surely not be realized. It is hardly in tune with the thinking of a pragmatist of Hashemi Rafsanjani's caliber that he should generate hostility from a superpower neighbor. The interests of the Iranian nation would again be granted priority, and devotion to the Islamic *ummah* would rarely go beyond the level of the rhetorical.

Parliamentarianism

There is a proposition held by many in the liberal community inside Iran, and not entirely wishfully, that the post-Khomeini milieu in Iran will be receptive to a growth in the parliament's strength. The premise of this proposition is that because of the large number and relative formlessness of competing factions in Iran, the minimal payoff solution will be optimal. The probabilities of success for any faction or individual is low in the short term and even lower in the near short term. As the factional leaders could learn quickly, the price they must pay to security leaders for joining their alliance may include placing the security leaders in a good position to seize power from their mentors. For most of the regime politicians, competing within a parliamentary system for the favor of the electorate may well offer the best hope for success and almost certainly the lowest price for failure.

Two aspects of the contemporary Iranian situation make a strategy with the objective of establishing a parliamentary democracy in Iran worth serious consideration. The first of these is a by now seven-year tradition of real input from parliament in the decisional process. The rejection of two successive nominees for minister of defense following the 1984 election is a good example of parliament's independence. Debates in parliament are frequently spirited and taken seriously by government leaders. Thus the custom of legislative participation in governance is accepted and, to

some degree, presently habitual. The parliamentarian strategy simply calls for continuing and strengthening it by broadening the range of candidates permitted to run for election.

A second favorable factor is the uneven but still meaningful trend toward a broader freedom of expression. Published journals represent a range of opinion within the religious community, and there is a good deal of testing the boundaries of freedom of expression. Petitions for new or resurrected journals, such as the Freedom Front's *Mizan*, are also not uncommon. Furthermore, this degree of freedom of the press is endorsed by many within the government and, in particular, by Ayatollah Montazeri. Thus a move toward a broadening of freedom of expression would not be a radical move.

In addition, the historical association of many of the regime's leaders with liberals such as Mehdi Bazargan has left a legacy of trust and understanding; they are not seen as a serious threat. This, however, reflects the primary weakness of the liberals: their limited and demoralized base of support. As discussed earlier, the natural support base of the liberals is largely to be found in the intransigent opposition pole. The bargaining position of the liberals, weak in the months following the revolution when they controlled the government apparatus, is now much weaker. They have little to offer competing factions who might well be looking for allies in their struggle for power or for survival. Reversing this situation would require nothing less than a major change in attitude within the liberal support base in the direction of gaining a renewed sense of efficacy. Nevertheless, the liberal leadership can be expected to make a serious effort to maintain and strengthen democratic institutions when Khomeini passes from the scene. The role of Ayatollah Montazeri in bringing success to such an endeavor obviously would be critical.

Dictatorship by the Opposition

The possibility that a strategy could be constructed to produce a dictatorship based on the opposition core in the short term following Khomeini's passing from the scene is remote to nonexistent. There are three possibilities for such a development: a coup by a secular-minded officer group in the regular military, a successful uprising led by the Mujahaddin organization, and an external-power-supported coup led by a combination of exile groups.

Military Coup. There was a brief period in late 1980 and early 1981 in which a coup by the regular military seemed possible, although far from probable. The Revolutionary Guard was still inchoate in form and the agonizing struggle of President Bani Sadr to survive a deadly challenge from religious leaders was nearing a climax. The

Iraqi army was in occupation of the city of Khorramshahr and a considerable part of western Iran. Bani Sadr in this period absented himself from Tehran as much as possible and spent his time with the military confronting the Iraqi forces. He was, in addition, firming an alliance with the Mujahaddin. The stage appeared to be set for a serious confrontation, possibly involving a clash between the regular military and the revolutionary military forces and almost certainly spilling over into elements of the population that had supported the revolution. But the confrontation did not materialize. The explanation for this failure is far from self-evident, but the fact of the failure even to make a significant move in this direction is the basis for the judgment that this strategy has little to no short-term potential. Since that period, the Revolutionary Guard has developed into surely the most dynamic institution of the revolutionary regime. Its influence is felt in foreign policy and internal security as well as at the front. The regular military, in contrast, is confined strictly to the front and is declining in influence even there.

A scenario with some credibility can be constructed that would describe how a growth in regular military influence following Khomeini's passing could occur. In such a scenario the confrontation between factions leads to a major effort to attract security-force allies and the regular military is solicited for this purpose by individuals with major assets within the regime. A Hashemi Rafsanjani-Khamenei struggle, for example, might well evolve in this direction if reports from Iranian observers are accurate.[12] They claim the former's influence is greater in the Revolutionary Guard and the latter's in the regular military. But even in such a scenario, optimal success for the regular military would leave it highly dependent on its alliance with leaders with a strong interest in perpetuating a religious-based regime.

Mujahaddin. There is only one organization within the intransigent opposition that has a significant internal capability to trigger a national uprising. The Mujahaddin demonstrated in 1981-82 that they had the organizational capability and the mass base of support necessary to mount a major challenge to the regime. They did so in a highly effective campaign of bombings and assassinations. The end result was the elimination of a shockingly high percentage of the regime's leaders. But they inadvertently tested the strength of the regime as well, and the results were intimidatingly impressive. Just as Saddam Hossein of Iraq grossly underestimated the internal support for the regime, so the Mujahaddin tactics were premised on an assumption that their success in executing terrorist tactics would underline the fragility of the regime's control base. Whereas the tactics of the anti-Shah revolutionaries succeeded in demonstrating to

the Iranian public the vulnerability of a regime they had seen as invulnerable, the Mujahaddin tactics demonstrated that the regime could easily survive even a major and brilliantly executed challenge. By easily surviving the simultaneous Iraqi attack and Mujahaddin challenge, the Khomeini regime provided excellent evidence of the strength of its internal authority.

Following a brutally tough governmental response that included the execution of several thousand individuals accused of a Mujahaddin connection, the Mujahaddin altered its tactics. It did so in two sharply opposed directions. First, it risked being charged with treason to Iran and to Islam by openly soliciting cooperation with the Islamic Republic's most dangerous external enemies. As indicated earlier, this tactical choice reflects very well the intensity of the detestation of the Khomeini regime. The Mujahaddin had had a purist view opposing any association with imperialist powers and regional leaders who were regarded widely by the informed public as agents of those powers. The decision to establish a working relationship with an Iraq widely perceived in Iran as an agent of both superpowers and to see no element of betrayal to the national cause in doing so tells a great deal about the absolute quality of their opposition. Second, it operated internally in a far more classical clandestine manner. Public sympathy is required to be successful and apparently the Mujahaddin has enough public support to sustain this aspect of its tactical plan. The Mujahaddin, of course, believes the public support is extensive. But since 1983, once having badly crippled the semi-overt Mujahaddin organization, the regime has considerably relaxed its coercive activities. There is no indication of any strong feeling that a return to a more coercive path is necessary. This behavior conforms with the judgment of many visitors from Iran that the Mujahaddin base of support is now too limited for it to have any success with a campaign that could result in an uprising. It goes without saying that the intransigence of the Mujahaddin attitude prevents their following a tactical line of playing with governmental factions.

Externally Sponsored Coup d'etat. Most of the other exile-led groups which are classified as intransigent in their opposition cannot think in terms of sponsoring an internal coup simply because they lack the kind of access to governmental institutions, including now the military, that could give them the ability to think in such operational terms. Like the Mujahaddin, they have no real option other than triggering an uprising. Unlike the Mujahaddin, they lack a sufficient internal organization to be able to think seriously of producing an uprising with their own resources. Since there is a strong tendency on their part to exaggerate the ability of external

powers, particularly the United States, to influence internal developments, they see as realistic a plan of action that focuses almost exclusively on gaining external backing. Those who accept the view that the United States helped bring the Khomeini regime into power and remains a major source of support and influence can think seriously of a US-sponsored coup. For them, the Americans have a full sufficiency of access for such an enterprise; thus the tactical preoccupation with convincing the US government that its anticommunist purpose would best be served by bringing one or more of the exile groups into power makes sense. Opposition leaders who recognize the lack of US internal influence are also preoccupied with gaining US support, but they are more likely to solicit direct US military action on their behalf.

The US/British success in helping execute a coup against Dr. Musaddiq in 1953 is the source of most of this unwarranted optimism regarding US capability. As more evidence regarding that action comes to light, the factor of good luck appears more and more explanatory. But even if it weren't, a belief that a coup executed more than a generation ago in an Iran in which the vast majority of people were politically passive could serve as a model for one in an Iran in which mass politics is a characteristic feature reflects the unreality of the exile view.

The Most Probable Scenario

The judgment that the speaker of parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, has achieved the position of front runner among Iranian contenders for power, it must be admitted, is based more on logical inference than on evidence. However, in spelling out a possible scenario of his tactics for gaining control after Khomeini's passing, much of the above analysis can be underlined. Hashemi Rafsanjani must move extremely fast to consolidate power. This is true because of some serious vulnerabilities. 1) Hashemi Rafsanjani has no strong personal constituency in the core support group. He has maintained his position because of his understanding that only Khomeini has truly independent popularity. Of regime leaders, only Bani Sadr made a serious effort to gain a personal support base and that may have been the most important reason for his fall from favor. 2) Hashemi Rafsanjani's institutional base is of little use for his power purpose and he has had to construct a personal organization that is held together primarily by expectations of his winning the power struggle. He therefore cannot afford to see any weakening of those expectations. 3) His pragmatism, so important in allowing the building of an organization, is a problem in terms of ideological legitimacy. He appears to many as an unprincipled opportunist. 4) His hold on the security forces, absolutely critical for success, is particularly fragile

given the exceptionally strong bargaining position of security force leaders. Any sign of loss of momentum could lead to defections here.

It is critical, therefore, to establish a security force leadership of his allies which will quickly consolidate central direction in this coercive arm of government. Press freedom must be curbed and any public demonstrations led by liberals should be prevented or crushed. Hashemi Rafsanjani should make strong and ideologically pure (in the sense of agreement with Khomeini's line) statements and seek to bring the more radical elements of the Revolutionary Guard into the leadership. In the early days and weeks, he must appear in his radical revolutionary not his pragmatic stance. The battle should then move to leadership appointments to all governmental institutions. As many as possible of the commitments made to members of his organization should be fulfilled. Counter alliances by competing factional leaders should be carefully monitored and, in some cases, preventive actions should be taken. Of particular concern would be overtures to ethnic organizations—those of the Kurds being most important.

A move to end the war with Iraq could not be considered until there had been sufficient consolidation of power to give Hashemi Rafsanjani a sense of security. Following this, he could begin to assume his pragmatic stance and to start on the long process of whittling away at polarization.

What should be self-evident from this brief look at the problems that would face Hashemi Rafsanjani is the weak position of even the strongest contenders for power primacy in a post-Khomeini Iran. Political polarization of the populace, the lack of an established central control by the governmental leadership, the inadequacy of institutionalization, and the lack of significant independent personal support for any leader other than Khomeini add up to a set of serious problems for those competing for succession. They should not, however, obscure the greatest unknown of them all: the breadth of support for revolutionary Islam. The depth of support within the core is not unknown and is quite clearly extraordinary. The above analysis suggests that the breadth is insufficient to warrant optimistic expectations from its supporters, but there is little supporting evidence for that conclusion. The first strategy outlined, the revolutionary ideological, might well prove to be closest to actual developments. If so the implications for the entire area will be profound.

Part Three

US Policy Options

The Iranian revolution was a bewildering event for US policymakers. The regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi that had appeared to be stable, secure, and willing to play an essentially surrogate role in US strategy in south Asia began inexplicably to unravel and collapse. Two major policy tendencies could be identified within the Carter administration as this phenomenon developed. One tendency, centered in the State Department, was to treat the revolution as essentially indigenous and the product of profound internal developments. Those who so viewed the revolution tentatively suggested that the US government make some effort, in the form of supporting a transitional government, to slow the pace of the revolution and to push it in the direction of its more liberal leaders.[13] The other tendency, focused on the National Security Council and specifically identifiable with National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, treated the revolution as very favorable for the Soviets and quite possibly orchestrated by them.[14] Brzezinski argued a case for buoying up the Shah's regime even to the point of helping execute a coup d'etat by military leaders who favored a hard line including ultimately suppressing the revolution. President Carter leaned toward the Brzezinski position but events moved too rapidly for a specific tactical plan to be prepared.

Fears of a pro-Soviet Iran waned when confronted with a revolutionary regime that was, at the very least, fiercely independent. Once again two policy tendencies emerged. The State Department now appeared to be inclined toward a policy of normalizing relations with the new regime as quickly as possible in an attempt to strengthen to some degree the liberal reformist Bazargan government in its struggle with the radical religious revolutionaries. Brzezinski, relieved by the intensity of Khomeini's anti-Soviet attitudes, was less sanguine regarding Bazargan's prospects and somewhat attracted to the idea of a functional alliance with a charismatic, tough, anticommunist, religio-political leader in Iran.[15] The hostage crisis dissolved these two tendencies, but they would reappear in significantly altered form some years after that crisis was resolved.

For several years following the release of the hostages, the Reagan administration seemed little concerned with the implications of the Iranian revolution as it had evolved. At no time was there a serious effort to consider the question of what the implications were for US objectives in the Middle East and south Asia as a consequence of the consolidation of a militant Islamic government in Iran. The Iranian government and virtually all of its associated factions believed Iran was playing a vanguard role for a universal Islamic political movement. Would such a movement be an asset or

liability for the objectives of containing perceived Soviet expansionism, for maintaining the free flow of oil to western industry, and for preserving the security of the state of Israel, the three central objectives of US policy in the area for the past generation? There is little indication that question was even asked. Also hardly asked was the associated major question: Would US capability be sufficient to effect any serious alteration in the developing trend toward Islamic political activity in the area should the spread of Islamic militance be seen as a threat to US interests?

Two tendencies that reflect the difficulty in adjusting to the new reality produced by the appearance of militant Islam as a major factor in the political equation have appeared among US policymakers. The first is closely related to the central role that the so-called "moderate" Arab states have played in US regional strategy for the past generation. These states, many of them oil producers, were natural partners for a policy that sought to balance the objectives of containing the Soviet Union, insuring the free flow of oil, and preserving Israeli security. They were anticommunist, willing economic partners of the West, and, except at the rhetorical level, passively acquiescent of Israel. Islamic militance was a destabilizing force for all of them, and their fear of Iran was intense. US officials, especially in the State Department, were sympathetic. The threat to these regimes was a threat to a favorable status quo for US policy, and the desire to strengthen them was the primary factor in a developing tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.

However, another far more muted policy tendency was also discernible especially among those officials most concerned with halting perceived Soviet expansionism. The logic, given these premises, is easily developed and compelling. Whereas it is true that a de facto alliance with "moderate" Arab regimes served a useful policy purpose for three decades, it must be kept in mind that that alliance was simply instrumental for US strategy. The "moderate" Arab regimes, most of them with dubious claims to legitimacy and a narrow support base, were of little military consequence. Iran, on the other hand, was viewed as occupying a critical strategic position and as having a much more significant military potential. As long as Iran was a strong US friend, the alliance with cooperating Arabs was fully defensible. In the changed circumstances, however, the value of the alliance was far less clear. The new Islamic regime in Iran, fiercely independent and obviously able to command the loyalty of a significant section of the population, remained the United States' most natural ally in the struggle against Soviet expansionism. In addition, it proved to be a good economic partner for friendly states and was not perceived in Israel as a significant threat. The Islamic

Republic of Iran, it follows, represented a force that was harmonious with the US strategic purpose. Iraq, on the other hand, with its friendship agreement with the Soviets, a long history of intransigent opposition to Israel, and a reckless willingness to disrupt the oil flow in the Gulf, was a most dubious ally. It was this logic that provided much of the rationale for the covert and exploratory move toward Iran that occurred in the arms for hostages deal.

In order to relate US policy to the analysis of possible political developments in post-Khomeini Iran, four US policy options, two closely and two obliquely related to the tendencies just described, can be outlined.

Overturning the Regime

Immediately following the revelations about the US overture to the Iranian government, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger remarked at a press conference in Europe that the Iranian leaders were "lunatics" and must be overturned. The successor regime he had in mind was surely one that would resemble that of the Shah's in its foreign policy attitudes. Secretary Weinberger thus was giving expression to a view that must have caused hearts to skip a beat among royalist oppositionists in exile. That is, of course, exactly the policy they advocate. The first question such policy advocates must address is that of feasibility. The conclusion of this analysis is, obviously, negative. Little evidence supports a case that either the royalists or the Americans have the requisite internal organization to provide any hope for success for such a venture. The suggestion by some exiles for direct US military action in support of the royalists is not likely to be considered. Were it attempted, the result would quite probably be similar to that of Iraq's invasion in 1980 which was based on similarly optimistic expectations.

The probable consequence of a failed US effort to overturn the regime would be to strengthen the hands of the most anti-US factions, the ideological revolutionaries, and to push the opportunistic Hashemi Rafsanjani in their direction. Soviet policymakers would be granted the opportunity to gain influence at US expense. Even Khomeini, bitterly anti-Soviet though he seems to be, has rather consistently favored taking tactical advantage of Soviet-US rivalry. His view, though, that ultimately the two great oppressors will unite against the challenge from Iran is deeply ingrained in his successors, especially those from the revolutionary ideological element. Thus any long-term Iranian-Soviet alliance would be highly unlikely. Whether the Soviets would take advantage of short-term opportunities would probably depend on the state of Soviet-US relations.

Alliance with the Iranian Government

This option has already been tested. The willingness of the regime to respond favorably to such overtures has been confirmed. It is important to note, in fact, that the Iranians in contact with the Americans represented a cross section of the Iranian factions and not some mysterious "moderate" leaders. Furthermore, men as influential as Hashemi Rafsanjani have indicated that the regime would respond much the same way to another overture similarly involving the sale of arms to Iran. The expressed rationale is simple and pragmatic. The Iranian weapons system is essentially US in base, and thus the regime badly needs US arms imports. Beyond this, however, the Iranians saw the overture as essentially an admission of defeat for the US orchestrated strategy of operating through Saddam Hossein and other Arab lackeys to administer a defeat to the Iranian challenge. Thus their sense of power, already seriously exaggerated, was further strengthened. An additional overture would confirm that assessment. The result would be to increase the scope of strategic and tactical options the Iranians could seriously consider. The advocates of a messianic export of the revolution policy would likely find their position and influence considerably strengthened, and the Iranian resolve to defeat Iraq militarily would also likely be strengthened. Hashemi Rafsanjani took note of the US case that the tilt toward Iran would help contain and deter the Soviets and seemed to accept a conclusion that this interest was real, but there was no indication in his or other statements indicating any sympathy for joining the United States in an anti-Soviet front. Hashemi Rafsanjani, flexible as he is, would likely adopt a position parallel to that of the ideological revolutionaries were there another such US overture.

Increasingly Serious Tilt Toward Iraq

The consequences of following this option, essentially the US policy at the time of writing, would vary depending on the extent of the commitment. Considering Khomeini's view that the United States initiated and orchestrated the conflict, a view shared by many Iranian leaders in its entirety and by most to some degree, a full scale alliance would simply confirm a major perception. It would be seen as the consequence of a satanic policy that must be resisted to the end. Thus such a policy would have the same results as suggested for the above two options, that is, a strengthening of the position of those who are most suspicious of and hostile toward the United States. The response of the regime, as noted above, to severe internal and external challenges has been one of an intensifying resolve, and unless the disaffected elements are able to see some clear indication of

regime vulnerability, they are not likely to take any serious risks in opposition.

On the other hand, if Iraqi resistance were strong and seemed to reflect good morale and a community of purpose among Iraqis rather than heavy external assistance, the necessity for Iran to continue to sacrifice resources and life in a seemingly endless and inconclusive struggle would be less apparent. This could produce the kind of turning inward associated with the two scenarios suggested earlier which focus more on Iran than on Islam. The formula here is fairly easily stated. US policymakers first of all should recognize that the Iranians are inclined to see the Iran-Iraq War as US-initiated and orchestrated. A diplomatic strategy should be adopted with the objective of disabusing the Iranians of this serious misperception. US diplomacy since the revelation of the overture to Iran has tended, in fact, to confirm the Iranian view. A more even handed treatment of the two parties and an evident awareness and sensitivity to the Iranian view would be essential.

True Neutrality in Conjunction with Reestablishing Relations

The Iranian contention that the decision to reflag Kuwaiti ships amounted to an act approaching cobelligerence is easy to understand. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have significantly contributed to the Iraqi war effort in the form of financial, material, and other assistance. When Iran, responding to Iraqi air attacks on its shipping and industrial infrastructure, attempted to compel Kuwait to stop giving such assistance by threatening Kuwaiti shipping, the US government, in effect, intervened and prevented the Iranian effort from succeeding. Similarly, the US-initiated United Nations Security Council resolution could understandably be interpreted by the Iranian government as part of a strategy to rally international support for an embargo on Iran that felt it was as much a victim of aggression as Western Europe had been from Nazi Germany and was just as entitled to seek the defeat and removal of those responsible for the aggression. For the Iranian government these actions were confirmation that the United States was, and had been all along, a party to the aggression, indeed its initiator. However, the event that most incensed the Iranian government was the tragic deaths of several hundred pilgrims in Mecca in July 1987. For Khomeini, this act which he described as a continuation of the US-orchestrated conspiracy was the most heinous crime yet. It reflected a blasphemous desecration of that which is most sacred to Islam. The insult was compounded by the use of an Islamic lackey, Saudi Arabia. The US strategy was seen once again as being one of manipulating the Soviet Union, the Western European co-conspirators, Israel, and the

array of Islamic puppet regimes to assist in turning the world against Iran.

Should the option of true neutrality be considered by the United States government, the primary obstacle that must be removed is that presented by this intensely held Iranian interpretation of the situation. Altering that view requires at the very least, and only as a first step, a public recognition of the strength of the Iranian case—that it was the victim of aggression. It will require, as well, that US efforts to end the conflict be constructed in such a way as, first, not to lend themselves so easily to the conclusion of partisanship and, second, not to lend themselves to the interpretation that the shift in US policy amounts to an admission of defeat by the US initiators of the war. The price of this approach—the disaffection of the "moderate" Arabs,—would be high. There is little indication at present of a willingness to pay any price.

However, this option is probably the only one that could actually help those in Iran who favor a parliamentary scenario. Convinced that the war is a material and moral disaster, this element in Iran would like to end both the war and Iran's isolation. It favors reestablishing diplomatic relations with much of the world on the basis of nonalignment. Its position is strengthened by reducing the image of an Iran under siege from the great oppressors, in particular the United States. Such a US diplomatic stance would also be useful for the depolarization strategy associated above with Hashemi Rafsanjani who has a far better tactical position than do his liberal antagonists.

In addition to adopting a truly neutral policy, this option would require that effort be made to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran, probably beginning by initiating a dialogue with the Iranian government. As noted, Iranian officials clearly are willing to enter into a dialogue concerning the sale of badly needed arms to Iran, but they would be far less willing to consider entering a dialogue without preconditions. It is unlikely that they would do so, in any event, unless some progress had been made in convincing them that the United States was truly neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. However, the suspicion of US intentions is so deep that only an extended dialogue designed on the US side to disabuse the Iranians of their misperceptions would make normal diplomatic relations possible.

Conclusion

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from its first days in office has insisted that, henceforth, diplomatic relations with other

governments can be conducted only on the basis of sovereign equality. Deeply resentful of a long history of interference in Iranian internal affairs by European powers and the United States, the new regime was determined to inaugurate a new era in which there would be no tolerance for any form of external interference. In practice, Iranian policy has been true to this proclaimed objective with regard to external interference in Iran, but Iranian policy is driven, in part, by ideological messianism. Viewing the Islamic *ummah* as the community of primary concern and downgrading the importance of the Iranian national community, the government of the Islamic Republic has itself engaged in acts of interference in the affairs of other states with large Islamic populations. Since many of these states are long-term friends of the United States, the US government has been placed in the position of having to respond to pleas of assistance from them. However, Iran is militarily significant, and for those Americans who see Soviet southward expansionism as likely, it is potentially a natural and, indeed, vital ally for a strategy of containment. Iran, thus, is of great interest and importance for US policymakers, but the vicissitudes of US policy toward Iran suggest that there has been no crystallization of a conclusion as to whether the Islamic Republican regime is more an asset or a liability. There is much concern about political succession in Iran but also much uncertainty as to the implications of the different possibilities for US objectives in the region. The same uncertainty in analysis and ambivalence prevails regarding the strong trend toward Islamic political militance.

This listing of options reflects a general conclusion that US policy not only can have a significant impact on political succession in Iran but probably will have such an impact even if the present ambivalence prevails. The Iranian government sees the United States as initiating conspiracies against it and is, therefore, its most dangerous opponent. But it has demonstrated as well a willingness to enter into a relationship that might well have evolved into a de facto alliance. The conclusion that direct interference would likely fail in its objective reflects a broader conclusion that Iran has entered the era of mass politics and is no longer susceptible to externally engineered coups d'etat. However, the foreign policy of the United States is so critically important for Iran that, whatever its direction, it will strengthen some and weaken others in the succession process. At the time of writing there is every reason to conclude that since policy attitudes have not crystallized in the United States the impact will be inadvertent.

Notes

1. For an account of the rhythm of developments in revolutionary Iran see Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, Basic Books, New York, 1984.

2. The fate of the Left in Iran is particularly well covered in Dilip Hiro, *Iran Under the Ayatollahs*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston, 1985.

3. Ibid., p. 260.

4. Interview with Shapur Bakhtiar, Paris, April 1984.

5. See Tareq Y. Ismail, *Iraq and Iran: Roots of the Conflict*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1982. Also see Richard W. Cottam, *The American Impact on Iran*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Forthcoming.

6. All of Mehdi Bazargan's statements are available in the publication *Maktab*, published in Houston, Texas.

7. Hiro, *Iran Under the Ayatollahs*, pp. 187-88.

8. See Imam Khomeini, translator and annotator, Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution*, Mizan Press, Berkeley, 1981.

9. This estimate of the Revolutionary Guard leadership has been made in a number of interviews by acute Iranian observers during visits to the United States. It is unfortunately an example of an important assertion that because of lack of personal access to Iran US scholars are unable to investigate.

10. This observation is easily tested by comparisons of Iranian and Iraqi commentaries for similar periods in the Foreign Radio Broadcasts.

11. Many of Mehdi Bazargan's essays printed in *Maktab* are responses to various attacks on Bazargan and his positions by Hashemi Rafsanjani.

12. This is another important assertion made by visitors from Iran which cannot be investigated. However, it is made frequently by individuals with access and a concern for objectivity.

13. For an example of this thinking see William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, Norton, New York, 1981.

14. See Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter With Iran*, Random House, New York, 1985. See in particular page 106.

15. Ibid.

Glossary of Names and Terms

Ashura. One of the most holy days in Shia Islam. It is one of ten days commemorating the martyrdom of Hossein, son of Ali and grandson of the prophet.

Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar. A member of the National Front and longtime supporter of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq. Agreed to become prime minister in January 1979 as the Shah's last appointee in the hope of halting the drift toward radical religious control of the revolution. Fled into exile in France and became a major factional leader in the intransigent opposition community.

Abul Hassan Bani Sadr. Member of a prominent religious family who became a major adviser of Khomeini in exile. Was elected Iran's first president by an overwhelming majority in 1980. Became the primary target of the radical religious political leaders and was forced to flee Iran in 1981. Formed an alliance with the Mujahaddin which later fell apart. Maintains significant contacts inside Iran some of whom are well placed in the regime. Has some potential to play a role in the succession struggle.

Mehdi Bazargan. Engineer and professor who was a strong supporter among religious elements attached to the National Front of Dr. Musaddiq. Became the leader of the Freedom Front, a liberal religious coalition which played a major role in the revolution. Was appointed by Khomeini as first prime minister of the revolutionary regime. Lost a long power struggle and resigned when United States diplomats were taken hostage. Remains inside Iran and in contact with many leaders of the regime. Has written books and articles that have been published inside Iran that are sharply critical of the regime and of Khomeini's leadership.

Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Beheshti. Considered the organizational genius of the revolution. Formed and led the Islamic Republic Party and became the most powerful religio-political leader under Khomeini. Was concerned with the polarization in Iran and is believed to have planned to counter it but was killed along with much of the regime's leadership in a bomb explosion in 1982.

Faqih. Used here to refer to the jurist or guide designated by the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran to guide governmental policy to accord with God's plan for a just society.

Fedayan. Refers to Fedai Khalq which was most significant of the Leftist groups in the revolution.

Freedom Front. Also translated as the Liberty Movement, was formed following Musaddiq's overthrow and became the center for liberal religious political activity. Its leaders were Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani. It counted in its membership many individuals who remain active in the government. The Freedom Front is the focal point of the liberal opposition to the regime inside Iran.

Friday Prayer. Under the Islamic Republic the Friday Prayer, historically one of the most important institutions for communication in Islam, has become the forum for articulating basic governmental policy. Those chosen to lead the Friday Prayer in Tehran and major provincial cities are among the most important religio-political figures in Iran.

Imam. A term for a religious leader in Arabic which in Persian has come generally to refer to Ali and his direct successors. Khomeini is referred to commonly as the Imam of the Ummah, which signifies a particularly significant leadership position in Islam generally. The application is controversial and is never used by those strongly opposed to Khomeini.

Islamic Republic Party. The largest and most important political organization in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It evolved into a large umbrella organization with many factions included and was dissolved in 1987.

Hojatolislam Ali Hossein Khamenei. President of the Islamic Republic and considered one of the most powerful political leaders in Iran and a major contender for leadership in the succession.

Hojatolislam Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha. Highly articulate spokesman for what is considered the radical wing of the religious leadership. Advised the students who occupied the United States Embassy. Currently is Prosecutor General of Tehran.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The faqih of the Iranian government and the charismatic leader of the revolution. Called the Imam of the Ummah by his supporters, indicating a claim to leadership of the universal community of Moslems.

Khuzistan. The province of southwestern Iran which includes much of the territory referred to by Arabs as Arabistan. In modern Iran immigration has produced a majority of Farsi-speaking inhabitants, but it remains a source of irredentist sentiment among Arab nationalists.

Komiteh. The name given to committees set up in sections of each Iranian city after the revolution to provide for the security, welfare

needs, and administration of justice in the area because of the collapse of governmental institutions. They have persisted, although much reduced in number, and the effort to provide central control of them has been a major concern of the political leadership.

Ahmad Madani. An ex-admiral and liberal intellectual who supported the revolution. Was a candidate for the presidency and received the second largest number of votes, apparently drawn largely from the middle class, secular community. Fled into exile and became a major figure in the exile community which maintains contacts in Iran which have government connections. Conceivably could play some role in the succession struggle.

Ayatollah Ali Akbar Meshkini. The Speaker of the Assembly of Experts which will meet to decide on Khomeini's successor. A hard line religious leader whose connections with conservative economic elements will likely push him in a non-radical direction. Rumored to have ambitions to become faqih succeeding Khomeini.

Mizan. The newspaper organ of the Freedom Front. It was suppressed but the effort being made to revive it is a major aspect of a campaign to liberalize the regime.

Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montezari. Currently the designated successor to Khomeini. A close associate and follower of Khomeini who resembles him closely in world view and aspirations for the universal Islamic movement.

Mir Hossein Mousavi. Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic as well as chairman of several supreme councils including the Economic Council, Council of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Tribal Council, and Council for Reconstruction and Renovation of War Stricken Regions. Is close to the more radical leaders in the government and often their sponsor.

Mujahaddin. Refers to Mujahaddin e Khalq, the organization which represented the activist religious Left in the revolution. It attracted the support of much of the youth that was disillusioned with what they saw as the passivity and weakness of the Freedom Front. It turned against the regime and carried out a campaign of violence against it. Today it is the organization with the greatest capability to foment an uprising in Iran against the regime. Its leader is Massoud Rajavi.

Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq. Leader of the secular, liberal nationalist movement of Iran, the National Front, and prime minister from 1951-53. Was overturned by a coup which was supported by the CIA and MI-6. Still regarded as the symbolic leader of Iranian nationalism and revered by many.

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Behzad Nabavi. Minister of Heavy Industry and leader of the radical paramilitary organization Mujahaddin of the Islamic Revolution. Is a talented organizer, strategist, and a primary leader of the more radical element.

National Front. An umbrella organization led by Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq and included in the 1950s most of the supporters of the national movement. It suffered atrophy as a result of its general passivity in the 1970s and lost the support of the youth, many of whom turned to the Fedayan. However, it remains a focal point of secular nationalist and liberal opposition to the regime and inside Iran is in coalition with the Freedom Front, the Radical Movement, and other liberal antiregime organizations.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The late shah of Iran. Overturned in February, 1979 by the Iranian revolution.

Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Speaker of parliament and one of the most powerful political leaders in the Islamic Republic. Considered a pragmatist. Was a central figure on the Iranian side of the Irangate operation.

Reconstruction Crusade. An organization established to develop rural areas and to bring social justice to the countryside.

SAVAK. The acronym for the most important of the Shah's security organization. It operated both internally and externally and was a symbolic focus of hatred for the regime.

Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani. Religio-political leader who died in 1979. Was second to Khomeini in popularity but sharply different in political philosophy. Was closely associated with Mehdi Bazargan in the Freedom Front but was far more sympathetic to the Left than Bazargan. Was regarded as the protector of the Mujahaddin.

Tudeh Party. The pro-Soviet Marxist Leninist party of Iran.

Ummah. Refers to the community of Moslems and is the primary focus of community identity articulated by the leaders of the regime. They denounce nationalism which is for them identified with secularism, but the question of the extent of their identity with the Iranian national community is one of the major unknowns for predicting the future evolution of the regime.

Vialyet e Faqih. The institution, guardianship of the religious jurist, which is the constitutional base of Khomeini's rule in Iran. It is one of the most unique institutions in constitutional history. Occupants of this position have the right to appoint or remove virtually any government official and ultimately have an absolute veto over governmental policy.

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